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SU.NPAY LAwS-THE POLICE POWER. Sunday laws whose application is iniform have generally been deemed constitutional. The
Legislature may restrict labor in various callings to certain hours
of the day, or to certain days of the week, if it deems such restriction essential to the physical and moral health of the community.
Moreover, Christianity is part of the law of the land, and 9ne of
the doctrines of Christianity is that one day of the week should be
freed from secular pursuits, and set apart, in theory, at least, for

religious observances.

(See

AM. L.

REG.

& REV,,

Vols. xxxI., p.

723, and XXXII., p. 4370 A further consideration is involved,
however, when statutes are directed at particular classes and particular localities. Laws making illegal the opening of barber shops
on Sunday have been passed recently in several of the States.
Eden v. The People, 43 N. E. Rep., No. 12, p. 1108, and Ex
pa-e Jentsct, 44 Pac. Rep., No. 8, p. 803, decided that such
a law was unconstitutional, declaring, in effect, that one class

should not be its special victims; that it was a deprivation of
property without due process of law, and could not be sustained as
a valid exercise of the police power. It may be remarked, however,
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that if a law operates uniformly on all in the same or competitivelines of business, is actuated by a rational public consideration,
and is otherwise unobjectionable, it should be declared invalid on
the ground that it is class legislation. And of the necessity of
legislation for all of a given class the Legislature is the judge. If
barbers are especial or sole offenders among those whose business
does not necessitate work on Sunday, it would appear to be in the
power of the Legislature, on the score of health, or of good morals
and Christianity, to pass a prohibitory law for them compelling
observance of the national Sabbath.
People v. Havnor, 43 N. E. Rep., No. 7, P. 541, decided April
14, 1896, by the New York Court of Appeals, introduces a new
element, however. The case arises under a statute providing that
anyone who carries on the business of a barber on Sunday commits
a criminal offence, except that in the city of New York and the
village of Saratoga his shop may be kept open till one o'clock.
The court holds that the statute was passed in the valid exercise of
the police power, which "guards the health, the welfare, and the
safety of the public " It proceeds to say that not everything that
the Legislature chooses to say is to be regarded as a valid exercise
of this power, but that any exercise of it must have a reasonable
connection with the general welfare, and then concludes, on the
strength of decisions holding that it is for the general welfare that
the Legislature should pass laws prohibiting work on the first day of'
the week, that this law is constitutional. Three judges dissent, the
grounds being that the statute discriminates unreasonably, and that
it is vicious class legislation, in direct violation of the Fourt~enth
Amendment. Certainly the discrimination between those engaged
in the same calling seems striking and unreasonable. The law
makes an act lawful in one city only and criminal in all the rest;
reasonably connected with the general welfare of one village, but
not so with any of the rest; one law during the day for the whole
State, and another during part of the day for two entirely different
communities. Conceding the right to make particular laws for
particular occupations and for particular localities, still it would
seem that a law which so arbitrarily singles out one city and village
from all other cities and villages, so far from furnishing "equal
protection of the laws," was distinct class legislation. To admit
such a statute under the police power, which allows only laws
reasonably connected with the health, order, business, and general
welfare of the community, without examining and demonstrating
its reasonableness, when on its face it is obviously discriminating
and wholly unreasonable, is to give to that power a dangerous and
unwarranted comprehensiveness.
REVERTER OF LAND GRANTED FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE.
Stuart v.
Ci' of Easton and Count' of NArlthanipon, June, 1896, (not yet
reported,) U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, for Third District.
In 1764, Thomas Penn and Richard Penn conveyed - a lot of'
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ground unto AB. et al., their heirs and assigns forever in trust
nevertheless, to and for the erecting thereon a courthouse for the
public use and service of the said county, and to.andfor no oher
use, intent or ujpose whatsoever."
The patent contains no
punctuation. These trustees had been authorized in 1752 by an
Act of Assembly "to take assurances of a piece of land for the use
of the inhabitants of said County, and thereon to erect a courthouse
and prison, &c."
By virtue of an Act of Assembly of 1834 (P. L. 538), the title
of the trustees became vested in the County of Northampton. A
courthouse was erected upon the ground and remained there until
1862, when it was removed, and no other buildings have been
erected thereon since. In 1888, the heir at law of the Penns made
entry for breach of condition, and brought ejectment. The question arises, Does the patent of 1764 convey a fee simple absolute or
an estate upon condition, a base fee ?
The learned court evaded this question by separately construing
the premises and the habendum: "'The succeeding words in trust
nevertheless to and for the erecting thereon a courthouse for the
public use and service of the said county and to and for no other
use, intent or purpose, whatsoever defined the relation between the
grantees and the inhabitants of the county, and restrained the
grantees from any other application of the property than to the
avowed object of the grant."
Surely this is a strained construction; in none of the cases cited
has it been even suggested. The court continues: "In the absence,
then, of express stipulation, is it to be supposed that the grant of a
conditional estate, determinable by re-entry upon non-user, was
intended?"
After the above disposition of a stipulation, which, in
Pennsylvania, whose decisions the court is bound to follow in this
case, has always been held to constitute a fee upon condition, the
learned judge asks for an "express stipulation."
The court was of
opinion that the grant was a charitable use, and that in the absence
of an express provision for a reverter to the grantors in the event of
a misuser or non-user, no right of entry to defeat such use was to be
implied. The consideration of that question has no place in the
decision of this case.
It has never been disputed that a man may make such legal disposition of his property as he chooses, and when he has made such
conveyance the courts are bound to effectually construe his deed.
Fees upon condition have been recognized immemorially.
It is settled that the mere expression in a conveyance of the
purpose of a grant will not, of itself, create a condition : Xeruin v.
Canipbell, 15 Pa. 500 (185o); Seebold v. Shitler, 34 Pa. 133
(1859). A base fee may be created without the usual technical
words, sub conditione, pro'viso, i/a qatod: Church v. Ground Co.,
103 Pa. 613 (1883).
Nor is an express stipulation that, upon
breach of condition, the grantor may re-enter, necessary; it is iniplied as part of the grant: IV Kent Com. 123 ; Grayv. Blanchar,
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8 Pick. 284; Osgood v. Abbott, 58 Me. 8o. Where conveyances in
fee simple, stating, the purpose of the grant, were made, with the
superadded words, "and for no other use whatsoever," (Sheet; v.
Fitzwater, 5 Pa. 126 (1847) ; 2 L. C. Am. R. P. 13), "and no
other purpose," (Kirk v.King, 3 Pa.436 (1846); Crane v.Hyide,
135 Mass. 147), itwas held that base fees were granted. In Kirk
v. King, the conveyance was to a trustee. And as recently as
1892, in Slegel v.Lauer, 148 Pa. 244, the Supreme Court, ina twoline per curiam opinion, adopted the exhaustive opinion of Endlich,
J., where a conveyance made to county commissioners for a specific
purpose, without superadded words, was held to convey a fee upon
condition, the use for the particular purpose constituting part of the
consideration for the grant. The learned judge, in this case, said:
'"But, where an estate is conveyed for a specific purpose. ' and no
other,' the fee is a fee upon condition, determinable upon cessation
of the use of the property for that purpose: ZKirk v. King (supra);
Sheetz v. Fitzwater (szzra) ; a fortiori should the words ' to and
for.no other use intent or p0urose whatsoever' constitute a fee upon
condition."
Agreeing with the learned judge that a grant for such a purpose
might be a charitable use, it is submitted that the premises for such
conclusion are wanting here. The conveyance to the trustees
authorized by Act of Assembly to receive such assurances was, in
the language of Lowrie, C. J., in construing a similar deed to
trustees in trust for a church congregation, "mere matter of form,
and does not at all make this case a charitable use:" Brendle v.
ConVegation, 33 Pa. 415 (1858).
In that case the deed was held
to vest an executed legal estate in the congregation. Moreover, in
1834, the trustees' title became vested in the county, and during
its tenure of the qualified fee simple estate the breach of condition
occurred. When the specified purpose of the grant ceases, the
estate of the trustees cease: .Jfctissick v. Pickle, 21 Pa. 232
(1853) ; HJfenderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. 335 (1868).
In the latter
case, the conveyance was to trustees for a specified purpose, and it
was held that the trustees took merely a fee upon condition, which
terminated when the premises ceased to be used for the specified
purpose. The same conclusion was reached in Siegel v. Lauer,
(stipra), where the conveyance in 1772 was to the Commissioners,
to and for the use, etc. Neither upon principle nor upon authority
does the learned court's conclusion seem tenable.
[It is a curious fact that in 1852, when these defendants removed
from a lot granted by a similar patent for a prison, "and for no
other use whatever," they purchased from the three heirs-at-law of
the Penns their reversionary interest in the property.]
SELF-INcRIMIXATING TESTIMONY.
In the recent case of Brown
v. J;dnker,' 16 Supreme Ct. Rep. 644, the important issue arose of
an alleged incompatibility between that clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which says that 'no person . . . . shall
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be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,"
and the Act of Congress of Feb. I1, 1893, relative to the giving of
testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission, that IIno
person shall be excused from attending and testifying, or from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the
subpoena of the commission .....
.on
the ground or for the
reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture
But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify., or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said commission, or in
obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in
any such case or proceeding."
Two main questions were considered by the Supreme Court:
First, does the clause in the Fifth Amendment, that no one shall be
compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself, mean
that he shall not be required to give testimony when it will lead to
his punishment, or is it to be interpreted to include the giving of
testimony when it will expose the witness to ii-famy and disgrace,
although a criminal prosecution might not follow? Second, is the
protection given by the statute coextensive, to the necessary degree,
with possible prosecution?
In consideration of the first point it is evident that in a criminal
case no one could be compelled to give evidence in respect to a
material fact if he might assert the privilege because of his testimony
merely reflecting upon his character. A witness may be compelled
in civil cases to testify as to matters which bring him into disgrace,
yet which do not lead to punishment. There are innumerable
transactions which are "o' the windy side of the law" and still
prove a man's character to be anything but savory.
In criminal proceedings there are classes of cases which have been
held to be exceptions, but which prove the general rule to refer to
funtishment, and not to the odium which may attach. These are
laid down by Mr. Justice Brown, in his opinion for the majority of
the court, under four headings:
i. If a witness waives his privilege, he is not permitted to stop,
but must make a full disclosure,, and is liable to cross-examination.
2. If prosecution for a crime is barred by the statute of limitations, the witness may be compelled to testify.
3. If the answer of the witness may have a tendency to disgrace
him, and the proposed evidence be material to the issue on trial, the
great weight of authority is that he may be compelled to answer.
4. The English cases, although following only a rule of evidence,
hold that when the witness has already received a pardon, he can
no longer claim the privilege of silence.
Numerous cases in various State courts have held, in analogy to
the line of English cases above referred to, that the requirement is
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satisfied if the witness is given full and adequate indemnity against
any liability to prosecution. The majority of the Supreme Court
held to this construction of the terms "witness against himself."
Mr. Justice Field dissented vigorously from that view. He based
his opinion mainly upon the case of .Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates,
429;
he also advanced the argument that Congress has not the
power to enact a statute to protect the individual, holding that the
pardoning power is exclusively in the President. This appears to
be against the weight of authority, for acts of general amnesty have
almost invariably been sustained in this country, as well as in
England.
The second point of vital importance considered by the court
was in respect to the extent of the protection guaranteed by the
Act of Congress. There is no doubt whatever as to the sufficiency
of the protection within the Federal jurisdiction ; but it was argued
that a possibility exists of prosecution in the State courts. To quote
the words of Mr. Justice Brown, "We are unable to appreciate the
force of this suggestion. It is true that the Constitution does not
operate upon a witness testifying in the State courts, since we have
held that the first eight amendments are limitations only upon the
powers of Congress and the Federal courts, and are not applicable
to the several States, except so far as the Fourteenth Amendment may
have made them applicable: Barron v. Afazor, 7 Pet. 243 ; FVox v.
State, 5 How. 41o ; [Vithers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; Twitchell
v. C011., 7 Wall. 321 ; _Presser v. State, 116 U. S. 252.
"There is no such restriction, however, upon the applicability of
Federal statutes. The sixth article of the Constitution declares that
'this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.'
"The language of this article is so direct and explicit that but few
cases have arisen where this court has been called upon to interpret
it, or to determine its applicability to state courts: . . . . Stewart
v. Kahn, iI Wall. 493 ; United States v. TVylie, ii Wall. 508;
Af)jyfeldv. Richards, 115 U. S. 137."
Argument was also presented that a witness testifying under this
decision might be prosecuted, and would then be put to the trouble
and expense of pleading his immunity. No stress was -laid upon
this objection, as the law does not consider such a detriment; and
again, anyone is liable, however innocent, to be prosecuted and
compelled to plead a defense.
Mr. justice Shiras, 'Mr. justice Gray and Mr. Justice White
concurring, delivered an opinion, in which he disagreed with the
conclusion of the majority as to the efficiency of the immunity from
State prosecution. This is probably the strongest argument advanced
by the minority of the court. If the contention of Mr. Justice-
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Shiras, that Congress cannot prescribe rules of proceeding for the
State courts, is correct, then apparently the ground of support for
the holding would be that the requirement is fulfilled when complete protection is given within the jurisdiction gathering the
evidence,-in this instance full protection within the domain of
the Federal courts.
This decision that a witness may be compelled to give testimony,
although self-incriminating, when shielded from criminal prosecution therefor, by reason of a previous legislative pardon, settles, for
the present at least, an important question in evidence. The decision is of great practical moment, as wrongs by individuals, and of
of late especially by large corporate concerns, have gone uncorrected
on account of the ability of those having knowledge to shield themselves by that clause of the Fifth Amendment just considered.

